The following is a true story which I am relating the best I remember it. I have added the testimony of two officers who were aboard and quite involved that night.

THE NIGHT WE NEARLY LOST THE SHIP & OUR LIVES

Preface: The last ship I was on before getting out of the navy was the USS Bausell DD-845. For those who don’t know much about the navy and ship types a DD is a destroyer. Destroyers of that vintage were just shy of 400 feet in length … small compared to modern day destroyers. All of the older destroyers (or “tin cans” as they are often called) which were still in service were showing their age … and were overdue in being retired from naval service. It was a full time job trying to keep them operational as they were really deteriorating. Even the hulls had thin areas and actual holes sometimes. Yet they were well made … better than several of the newer destroyers which often could not be depended upon to keep their scheduled assignments … something was always breaking down on the newer ones. The older tin cans like I served on almost always were dependable and often had to pull extra duty taking the place of the newer ships which could not get underway. I really enjoyed being a “tin can sailor” … as it was “the real navy” … no bird farm (aircraft carrier)(floating city) for me. Serving aboard a tin can was challenging and the ride exciting as they were small enough to be tossed about like a cork in heavy seas. And during my 8 years in the navy I experienced being out at sea in some pretty nasty weather conditions … many bad storms and a few hurricanes/typhoons. Water is a very powerful force and can destroy a ship. And fire and flooding are very serious threats as well. The story I am about to relate involved a category 5 “super typhoon” … “Pamela” to be exact. She changed course and we had to deal with her. Here is the story as I attempt to recall that night: “I guess the most memorable event on the Bausell (or any ship I served on) for me was the last time I went out to sea on her. We were in extremely rough seas and really struggling to ride out the weather we found ourselves in. Nighttime came upon us and our old vessel had lots of problems with sea water entering thru various places. In these sea conditions it is nearly impossible to do much of anything so normally only those sailors who have to be up to stand watches, performing emergency work or are involved in food preperation and feeding the crew were up. All others were usually laying in their racks (beds) just riding out the storm. We sometimes strapped ourselves in so as not to be tossed out by the violent moving of the ship. Our rest was suddenly disturbed when the electrical load was “dropped” and we found ourselves in serious trouble as the ship was being tossed about like a cork and sea water was pouring in, especially into after steering thru the manhole area. Aftersteering is the compartment aboard ship where the rudder posts come up thru from below and massive arms are attached which connect to the hydraulic rams which move back and forth to turn the rudders and steer the ship. We had to respond to this emergency as there was no way to steer the ship from the bridge anymore. The “at sea fire party” was called out to deal with this emergency. The at sea fire party was made up of those of us who were most qualified to deal with any such emergency. As an HT (hull maintainance technician) my job included firefighting and damage control. HTs were the “experts” in this. The at sea fire party also was made up of other Repair Division personnel such as electricians, auxiallary machinist mates, enginemen, etc. as well as a couple of other engineering dept. personnel. We had to start the process of manually cranking and steering the ship’s rudders from back in aftersteering. We also had to start rigging emergency power to aftersteering from the No. 2 emergency generator but it was quite difficult due to the ship being tossed about so violently. To make matters worse hydraulic oil had spilled onto the deck of aftersteering from some 5 gallon cans stored back there. They had been tied up but not well enough to withstand the violent tossing of the ship going on. Mixed with the sea water which was sloshing around it was nearly impossible to stand up. The depth of the sea water was ever increasing and becoming a concern. Hand cranking in aftersteering is difficult and extremely tiring in the best of conditions but in these conditions it was nearly impossible. As if things weren’t bad enough suddenly a fire broke out back aft in the engineering berthing compartment which was the space just forward of aftersteering. All the while the “at sea fire party” was handling the situation. HT1 Gary Walters was the scene leader for the at sea fire party and I was the No. One OBAman. note: The role of scene leader is as implied … in charge of running things at the immediate scene … dealing with whatever the emergency threat is in the way of firefighting and damage control. He tells everyone else what to do on the scene as well as keeps Damage Control Central (or other command center such as the bridge if out to sea or the quarterdeck if inport) informed as to what is going on. He is subject to orders of higher command as to how to handle the emergency if they have ideas differing from his own. The role as OBAman is also an important one as he is the person who is actually dealing firsthand with the emergency whether it be investigating, firefighting, or controlling damage. There are at least two OBAmen (usually there are three). The number one position is the one in charge and is leading upfront. The number two position is right behind the number one position. He is second in charge and takes over if something happens to the number one position. In firefighting his job is to provide protection from fire for the number one position. This is done by using a special “applicator nozzle” on the fire hose which sprays out in front of the number one position. The term OBA stands for Oxygen Breathing Apparatus. It is a device worn which has a replacable canister and produces oxygen to breathe when in an atmosphere of insufficient air or dangerous smoke and fumes. There is a good website with lots of information and diagrams showing much of these things I speak of. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/55-501/chap11.htm As we were dealing with all of this more fires broke out up forward in the ship. At that point General Quarters was sounded which changed everything as far as the personnel assignments. The at sea fire party was no longer used as we had just moved to the highest state of emergency preparedness. HT1 Gary Walters was scene leader for Repair 2 up forward so he went up there to deal with the new threat. I was scene leader for Repair 3 back aft so I took charge back there. There is a third Repair Party aboard a destroyer. It is Repair 5 and is in the middle portion of the ship where the enginerooms and firerooms are located. The fire back aft was no longer a problem so I could fully concentrate on the aftersteering mess. Since the sea water and oil mixture was such a threat and there was no way to pump it overboard I suggested that we open up the deck drains in aftersteering and drain it down lower in the ship into the void below. It would not only get rid of the water but it would help stability at a time when we really needed all the help we could get. The DCA as well as the Capt. agreed to this and it worked beautifully. After getting rid of the sea water all we had to do is use rags to wipe up the oil residue and everybody could once again stand up without sliding all over the place which helped immensely in doing the difficult job of hand cranking and steering. Soonafter we got emergency power ran but an electrician had determined that it could not be used as the electrical panel and motor were shot. So it was necessary to continue on with hand cranking and manual steering. And soonafter that the electricians got the main generator and switchboard back online and we got everything else moreless back to normal. Those of us in engineering had the task of the hand cranking initially but after the emergency was over the deck department manned aftersteering and took over this difficult task of hand steering. All in all we thought we just might lose the ship that night as well as our lives as it got quite serious.” HT2 Steve Newbauer Repair Division USS Bausell DD-845 ******************************************************** Upon getting the story from others I discovered that there were indeed things I had all wrong. However, the same is true for the others as they made statements which were wrong as well. It was some 38 years ago so it is difficult to recall it accurately. One thing is for sure … these two officers were in a better position than I in knowing more detail of some aspects of what happened that night and what followed. ******************************************************** from a personal correspondence to me from Ltjg. John W. Stevens Damage Control Assistant/Repair Officer (my division officer) – I remember that night you wrote about in excruciating detail. When the scuttle was torn off by a wave, water poured in on top of the after steering swtichboard, shorting the board and causing loss of power to the steering motors. The alarm went off and they were announcing “The Ship Has Lost Steering Control.” I hauled ass to after steering. I was the first person on the scene. The switchboard was burning but there was no power. I jumped on the port steering motor and tried to get the cover off the gear so we could attach the hand crank handles. About that time, a new MMFN (Machinist Mate Fireman) standing Main Switchboard watch in the engine room saw that a breaker had tripped and reset the breaker. When he did that, the after steering switchboard exploded and the main breaker on the main board fused closed. I was standing in salt water with the 220V switchboard melting and flames shooting across the hatchway. I was scared to death and Chief Boatswain Mate Williams told me I was as white as a ghost. I jumped up and grapped some pipes or conduit in the overhead, and swung myself hand over hand until I could swing my legs toward the hatch. I got myself swinging, let go, and Chief Williams caught me and pulled me through. About a minute later, they got power secured and we reentered after steering. The “at sea fire party” arrived. I seem to recall you, EN3 Joe Sapp (it was EN3 Art LaBerge according to Art LaBerge who also stated in a comment that there was no Joe Sapp assigned to their shop) and someone else being there. That night we experienced a total of 11 fires, mostly electrical, and seven partially flooded compartments, mostly water and fuel tanks. We experienced winds in excess of 200 kts, 50 ft seas at sea state 12, and took a 62.5 degree roll at one point after we lost steering. Lt. Bob Lloyd was OOD and saved the ship by using the engines to steer until we got the hand cranks engaged. I seem to recall it took us nearly two weeks to get back to Guam because we could not go faster than 5 knots due to hand steering. When we got to Guam, there was hardly anything left standing and not a tree on the island. That was Super Typhoon Pamela, a category 5 typhoon. You can look it up on the internet and read all about what it did to Guam. In addition to being the DCA, I was also the ship’s swimmer. When we lost the kid overboard, they had me suit up with my swim gear, safety harness and whatall and wait in the midships passage. The XO (Executive Officer who is second in command) came back and told me that if we found him, they would not order me into the water and it would be my decision whether or not to attempt a rescue. I remember sitting there wondering what I would do if we found him, again pretty well scared to death. We never found the body. We had a generator reduction gear in a wooden crate on the flight deck. It came loose and was sliding all over the place. The newly arrived seaman saw the thing and thought he would try to secure it back to the deck. Unfortunately, it weighed about two tons and he got caught on the downside of it when the ship rolled to starboard. We later figured out that he was literally pushed through the stainless steel safety net and was certainly dead before he hit the water. ******************************************************** from Lt. Bob Lloyd – Weapons Officer posted on his website http://www.bobs-site.com/ss/typhoon.html (no longer a working link) Typhoon I was serving as Weapons Officer on a 390 foot long . We had just finished duty as photographic coverage ship for a triple Polaris missile launch south of the island of Guam, in the Pacific Ocean. As happens on occasion a good sized typhoon had taken an unexpected direction change and we got caught up in it. Large seas and strong winds make a very tiring situation out of shipboard life. Sea sickness is not as big a problem as just being worn out trying to keep your footing, trying to stay in your bunk, and trying to eat. Food is probably the second biggest problem, the cooks really can not prepare much when the ship is rolling up to 40 degrees from side to side. Dishes won’t stay put, and even when we use a grid on the table to hold the plates, the food doesn’t stay on them. Essentially you are reduced to eating sandwiches and drinking coffee. Those who tend towards a little queasiness generally stick to saltines. Walking down a passageway (a hallway) is a matter of one foot on the wall, then on the floor then the other foot on the other wall. Carrying something past open doorways can be quite interesting. Everything is in the timing. When you are in your bunk there are straps that you can use to hold you in place, but most people prefer to just brace themselves against the sides and grab whatever sleep they can. Since little is done under conditions like this other than watch standing, you get a lot of time to practice your preferred methods. About twenty-four hours into the storm I was asleep when the General Quarters alarm sounded. One thing you learn early in your shipboard life is that you always have your next day’s uniform ready when you go to bed. In this type of weather you also have your lifejacket at the ready. I was ready to dash to my GQ station in seconds. My GQ station was on the bridge of the ship as Officer of the Deck. I had to dash up three decks and forward about 100 feet. Normally this is not a big challenge, but with the ship rolling radically and the entire crew trying to get to their assigned station using only the interior passageways it was a bit of a challenge. The fact that we were all had big Kapok lifejackets only added to the difficulty. When I arrived on the bridge it was clear why General quarters had been called. We had lost control of the rudder with waves breaking over the bow of the ship and winds gusting to over 100 miles per hour. Fortunately, we were not in company with other surface ships and the submarine was able to go deep and avoid most of the problems we were facing. Normally it is best to head into big seas (waves) like this. Luckily, the rudder is only 3 degrees left so we should be able to control the ship successfully with the engines. As I take over the Deck things are a bit tense and I decide to take the Con (Control or the movement of the ship) as well. That way I will be giving the orders to the engines more directly. The Captain has arrived on the bridge and takes his position in the Captains’ chair. He is giving no indication of being overly upset although we both know the ship is in serious peril. If we should get parallel to the seas and take a hit by one of these huge waves it could be very very bad. The ship is now at General Quarters and we have the best people in the best place they can be in the ship to handle all emergencies. The report we have received from the steering gear room is that they have a fire and the steering electrical motors are not working. I am one of the fortunate few who can feel the subtle movement of the ship even before the indicators show what is happening. I have also been a ship’s engineer so I understand the mechanical operation of the steering electrical motors as well as the steam turbines and the damage control system. I’m probably the best equipped for the job I face as anyone could be. There is a delay between when I give an engine order and when it takes effect. When I give an order such as port engine ahead 234-RPM starboard engine ahead 217 RPM it is heard by the Lea Helmsman. The Lea Helmsman normally operates the engine order telegraph. That is a machine that mechanically sends signals to the engine rooms. It has levers that tell each engine in general terms how fast and in which direction to go. It, however, is limited in only giving one RPM command at a time. At a time like this we are depending on him giving verbal instructions to each of the engine rooms. He also is wearing sound powered phones, which go directly to each engine room. Sound powered phones are very much like what Bell originally created. The vibration of the person talking creates an electric signal which is sent to the earphones of someone on the other end. No external electricity is required. In each engine room a talker is listening to the Lea Helmsman. The Engine room talker relays the order to a that changes the amount of steam going into a large turbine. The throttleman has a direct read out of how many RPM his propeller shaft is turning. When he achieves the correct RPM he shouts the number back to his talker, who relays it to the Lea Helm, who subsequently reports the engine and the RPM to the Officer who has the Con. This may sound like a complicated and slow way to do things, but remember we are at GQ and the best people from the whole crew are in place to do the job correctly and rapidly. My only problem is to get the bow of the ship headed back into the waves and figure out what combinations of engine RPMs will keep me headed in the right direction climbing the wave, crashing through the crest, and descending the other side. Finally we get the report that there is no fire in the steering gear room. The hatch from the main deck had sprung in the storm and water had run on to the operating steering motor. The water had shorted the electric motor that drives the hydraulic pump that moves the rudderpost. The man who was on watch saw the sparking and arcing and made the fire report. I no sooner get a feel for the combinations that will work well than we hear a man overboard-portside report. Now the Captain is on his feet, but he still hasn’t said anything, so I haven’t screwed up so far. Normally the immediate reaction is to throw the rudder over to insure that the man isn’t caught in the propeller wash. This, of course, is not possible at this time and by the time the propeller could be stopped the man would be past the danger point. Additionally a rapid change in direction at this point could endanger the entire ship. Immediately, a life-ring is thrown overboard with lights attached to it. CIC (the Combat Information Center) starts a maneuvering table plot of where the man entered the water and the ship’s movement relative to that position. The men on the Signal Bridge fire up power full signal lamps trying to spot the man. The lookouts move to the bridge wings. The bridge wings are portions of the bridge which are outside the watertight doors and allow someone to see both forward and backward along the side of the ship. In this weather this is a rather dangerous position, but the risk must be taken when we have a man in the water. As soon as the bow breaks through the next wave crest I order the port engine back full and starboard ahead full. Hoping that we will get the ship around far enough to be safe before the next wave crest. We succeed and I bring both engines to ahead one-third until I can get the feel for the movement of the ship and the direction we need to go to get to where the man should be. Now we are a 400-foot long surfboard. As I feel the stern of the ship sliding as it is pushed up by the next wave. I have to adjust the engines by RPM again to keep us going in the correct general direction. Following instructions from CIC I do my best to get as close as possible to the position where they estimate the man to be. We pass within 100 feet of the position without seeing either the life-ring or the man. We finally get good news from the engineers. They have managed to get a backup system working for rudder control. Now we have a bit better control over the ship’s movement. Still limited by the weather but certainly better than just using the engines. Now CIC has set up a search pattern based upon the likely movement of the man in the water that takes into account as many of the factors as possible. After we have steering restored and have made a few more passes at the predicted location of the man in the water we stand down from GQ and restore the standard watch rotation. We are unable to follow the search pattern strictly but continue through the night. As the storm moves on and daylight returns the search turns more and more routine. Unfortunately, the longer the man has been in the water the less likely we are to come across him. After I am relieved of my duties on the bridge I am hit with more bad news. The sailor who went overboard was from my department. It was his first cruise and I had met him only briefly as he checked in. His General Quarters station was in the helicopter hanger. He managed to get to the hanger safely which was no easy feat in itself. Unfortunately, they were unable to get the door completely down and when we took a heavy roll he lost his footing and rolled out under the door before anyone could grab him. We searched as long as reasonable and never spotted any sign of the man nor even the life-ring. Neither of which is surprising considering the conditions of wind and seas at the time he went overboard. Needless to say, I didn’t get back to bed for a long time and had quite a chat with the captain. I also had a talk with the men in his division who had been in the hanger with him at the time. That was a rough time that ranged from counseling sailors with guilt feelings to investigating the circumstances surrounding the incident. I then sat down to write one of those dreadful letters that must be written to the parents. The Captain, of course, wrote his own letter to them, but I felt it was important that I write one also. That was not the end of it either. The parents wrote to their congressman, as they should have. He started an investigation that involved investigations by the Naval Investigative Service (NIS) and the Judge Advocate General (JAG). Thank fully, they all found that our treatment of the entire situation was proper from the familiarization that each new man went through to the search procedures we used. It turned out that the failure of the door to close was due to a mechanical failure that was not likely to have been foreseen. ************** and here is a personal correspondence from him to me: It sounds like you were more involved with the steering and fires and I was more concerned with keeping the ship heading into the seas rather than broaching. I can still remember the feeling of the ship surfing as we crested waves. I had a good idea of what was going on with the steering gear and fires having been an engineer for a couple of tours before becoming weps on Bausell. You guys did a great job in letting me worry about my job on the bridge while you handled the on-board disasters. ******************************************************** Some observations I have made in the telling of this event: I stated that after draining the sea water down thru the deck drains in after steering that it took care of the problem. One officer stated that the manhole cover was missing from a wave hitting it. That would mean that there would be about an 18 inch opening where a huge amount of sea water would continue to pour thru while in the heavy seas condition. I don’t recall much more water coming in so I don’t know what was done to prevent this. I honestly don’t recall a missing manhole cover. The other officer stated that the manhole cover was simply “sprung”. That would make far more sense to me but the other officer who claimed it was missing altogether should have known as it was his job to deal with such things being the Repair Officer and Damage Control Assistant. Of course, it was my job to actually repair or replace it. That is why I find it hard to believe I don’t remember anything about it. I thought the threat was merely a matter of badly deteriorated metal around the manhole. If that was not the case and all that sea water was coming thru the manhole I would have thought that it was a matter of the manhole cover simply being open and needing to be closed. I have a difficult time accepting that the cover was missing altogether as most of the sea water which was coming in ceased at some point in time. I would rather believe that we got the cover back down and tightened and it prevented further problems. I know that we had deteriorated metal around the manhole and sea water entered thru. Concerning the seaman who went overboard … I don’t even remember anything about this. The two officers tell different stories concerning it. One said the man rolled under an open door (it was an overhead door which was supposedly not able to close all the way) while the other said the man purposely went out onto the flight deck to attempt to secure a wooden crate which had come loose (it had been tied down) and was sliding back an forth as the ship tossed from side to side. One officer indicates that the man simply went overboard while the other stated that it was determined that he was cut up like a potato going thru a cutter as he was between the heavy crate and steel cable netting. The other officer makes no mention of this but seems to indicate that they were always looking for an intact body. I just find it incredible that I can not recall anything about this incident.

A side note … the hanger bay with the overhead door was our work shop where I worked out of.

It was mentioned that the flight deck had steel netting around its perimeter. Here are some pictures showing this …

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The nets are laid down here, but they were up when this happened and it was reported that the sailor was pushed thru this netting when the 2 ton crate slid across the deck.